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ABSTRACT

The critical examination of society's circumstances, institutions, and cultural predispositions and values can help detect problems and injustices and can suggest opportunities for improvement. Neo-Marxist critical theorists of the Frankfurt school are committed to work of this kind, but their perspective is informed by Marxian precepts, and their effort is to render Marx in modern terms consistent with what they see as the spirit of Marxism, rather than to engage in an open-minded and critical inquiry into prevailing social values. This paper begins with a critical examination of the assumptions and conclusions drawn by these theorists, who have taken on the task of explaining why history has failed to unfold according to Marx's prophecies of inevitable class conflict in western capitalist nations. It is argued that Marxist "dialectical method" consists ultimately of the application of a point of view that is assumed rather than tested, which can only yield conclusions that are based on ideology rather than on inquiry. The second part of the paper explores the viewpoints of Marxist critical theorists with respect to educational administration. In contrast to the critical theorists, the author contends that educational administration requires an ethical perspective that emphasizes the use of reflective methods to make concrete moral choices. (TE)

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Marxian Critical Theory and Educational Administration:
A Criticism

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MARXIAN CRITICAL THEORY AND EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION: A CRITICISM

The critical examination of our circumstances, institutions, and cultural predispositions and values is a highly desirable activity. It can help us to detect problems and injustices and can suggest opportunities for improvement. At the center of such critical work is the interplay of a perspective with perceptions of circumstances and institutions.

Marxian Critical Theory

Critical theorists are committed to work of this kind, but their perspective is an insular one essentially informed by Marxian precepts. Critical theory is usually connected with the thinkers associated with the Institute for Social Research founded at Frankfurt, the so-called Frankfurt School.¹ Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse are perhaps the best known if Habermas, whose writing is more recent, is given a special status.²

The critical theorists, and neo-Marxists generally, have attempted to reinterpret aspects of traditional Marxist thought.³ Their work is an effort to render Marx in modern terms consistent with what they see as the spirit of Marxism. These thinkers have maintained an allegiance to Marxism despite its shortcomings, possibly because it represents for them a political statement as well as an intellectual orientation. The Institute for Social Research was almost named the Institute for Marxism and it was resolutely devoted to Marxist studies.⁴

The harshest adversaries of the critical theorists have been orthodox, traditional, or scientific Marxists.⁵ This is not surprising since their quarrels are over points of

belief within Marxism and are like doctrinal disputes within a church that sometimes end in charges of heresy.

Class struggle and society

What are some of the main concerns of the Marxian critical theorists? One has to do with class conflict. Marx took the class struggle as a prime instance of the dialectic in action in history. He attributed necessity to his version of unfolding history, but history failed to cooperate, and Marx's prophecies turned out to be wrong. Western capitalist nations instituted reforms that promoted social justice, and the workers in western democracies showed little interest in Marxist ideas, let alone in the overthrow of their elected governments in favor of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In these nations, it was generally a few intellectuals who stressed class consciousness while the workers remained essentially unmoved.

Critical theorists took on the task of explaining why things didn't pan out as Marxist doctrine predicted. Many of them explored the concept of false consciousness. They argued that the false consciousness of the working classes was promoted by societal institutions that served the ruling classes. Adorno and Horkheimer's discussion of the culture industry is one example of this kind of work. Current writing on critical theory indicates that false consciousness remains a key concern. Eyerman, for instance, notes the western workers' emphasis on upward mobility, consumption, family, and leisure; he states that "Today, especially in America but to a growing extent in Western Europe as well, it seems collective experience or class itself, can only be produced theoretically, that is, by Marxist intellectuals."⁶ The lament is that if workers could only be converted from false consciousness to class consciousness, progress would occur. For most Marxists, this means revolutionary progress. Reformism continues to be an epithet in their thinking.

The concept of false consciousness again underscores the familiar analogy with dogmatic religion that is so instructive in looking at Marxism. The workers are unbelievers deceived by false societal idols. It is the vocation of the anointed or believing Marxists to preach their gospel or engage in praxis to convert unbelievers so that eventual salvation in the form of a classless society can be attained.

What warrant exists for the concept of false consciousness? It has been used in an after the facts mode to salvage defective Marxist thought on history and class conflict. Like many Marxian concepts it carries heavy ideological baggage; false consciousness is false because it represses class consciousness which is the true or proper Marxist stance. Moreover, false consciousness is engineered by dominant, oppressive social forces. However, such Marxist doctrine does not constitute a warrant. In fact, like a lot of pre-given convictions, it misleads. Workers can and do judge that their self-interests are served in a democratic society that features free dissent and upward mobility along with efforts to provide equal opportunity and social justice through legislative means. After all, modern history teaches that insults to human freedom and potential are found in repressive regimes of both the right and the left.

In general, critical theorists have had a hard time with the personal freedom and social mobility that characterize western democracies. It just doesn't fit their Marxian preconceptions. They have greatly overemphasized the unity of society and have assumed the existence of an all powerful, monolithic ruling class. In reifying society in this way, they have neglected cultural diversity, societal pluralism, and the part played by a range of groups and coalitions in competitions for power and influence in democratic societies. Jay points out that the members of the Frankfurt School saw liberalism as the precursor of fascist totalitarianism, but he notes that even during their sojourn in the U.S. they failed to explore seriously why such a transformation did not occur in American society.⁷

Technology is also a source of oppression for most critical theorists, although Connerton contends that here the Frankfurt thinkers including Habermas simply follow the pessimistic themes of German sociology as expressed by Simmel, Weber and Tonnies.⁸ In any event, critical theorists generally stress the domination of technology over man rather than the liberating potentials of technology. They also tend to associate science with the more negative consequences of technology. In so doing, they overlook the contributions that scientific methods and thinking can make to the pursuit of a just and free society. Dewey, of course, explored at length the interrelations of inquiry and democracy. That analysis was, in fact, central to his social philosophy.⁹ However, the critical theorists seem confused about pragmatist-instrumentalist thought, a point considered later.

Despite the flaws in the positions of the critical theorists, the topics they pursue often are crucial ones. For example, their interest in the abuses of power, a traditional concern of democratic theorists as well, touches on a problem that has become more complex and more urgent in the modern era.

In the western democracies where the dominant economic system is a controlled version of capitalism, a major issue is the power of wealth. In these societies, this issue has been addressed in various ways. For instance, efforts to guarantee access to the media for diverse viewpoints and to regulate the financing of political activities represent attempts to limit the influence of wealth. The ideal is the free flow of information with the protection of dissent and a well educated citizenry able to work its will through the electoral process. Of course, such ideals are never fully achieved. No one disputes that. However, persistent and extensive efforts to attain them in democratic societies suggest that Churchill was right when he remarked that democracy is the worst form of government except for any other that has ever been tried.¹⁰

In the avowedly Marxist nations, the problem is the power of a one-party state that exercises rigid control in numerous areas of everyday life, and which is intolerant of diversity and dissent. This pattern is exemplified at its worst in Stalinism, but it is dramatically exhibited today in such cases as the plight of the oppressed Polish workers whose solidarity and class consciousness are not exactly what Marxists had in mind. Jay tells us that the members of the Frankfurt School never focused on the evils of Stalinism. He attributed this in part at least to the "difficulties involved in a Marxist analysis, however heterodox, of communism's failures."¹¹ Later critical theorists were not so hesitant. Nevertheless, given their interest in history and in concrete political contexts, the pattern of state domination and restrictions on human rights that has characterized Marxist regimes has got to represent a major intellectual and ethical burden for them. After all, critical theorists lay claim to a commitment to social justice and to praxis or activity directed toward that end.

Marxism as dialectical materialism but in its other forms as well has never been strong on the systematic treatment of values. The notion of class struggle has more or less substituted for a more complete kind of analysis. The lack of a well developed conception of values and the inadequacy of class struggle as a motivating concept along with the emergence of oppression rather than emancipation where Marxism has won out has serious consequences for Marxian praxis.

Critical theorists and neo-Marxists generally are caught in a trap. Despite the failures of Marxism they are reluctant to give it up, so they have expended considerable intellectual energy in reinterpretation. However, reinterpretation cannot go so far that it is patently non-Marxist. One result has been an ambiguity about certain positions and an emphasis on criticism of non-Marxist social and political institutions and viewpoints. Thus, we find among critical theorists a proclivity for the polemical scrutiny of other perspectives and extensive and often quite captious commentaries on various economic and political arrangements, especially those of

western democracies. As the name implies, critical theory consists in great part of criticism. The ambiguity enters in connection with certain fundamental but intellectually awkward elements of Marxism. An example would be the Marxian commitment to revolutionary change. Edgley contends that Marxism is distinguished from other forms of socialism because it is revolutionary.¹² Reformist socialism is seen as essentially conservative in outlook and consequences. Yet, to champion revolution over reform in free, democratic societies seems absurd. Rather than explicitly rejecting revolution in such circumstances, critical theorists and neo-Marxists often seek a rhetorical solution.¹³ That is, they do not directly discuss the issue, but signal their solidarity by occasionally using terms like revolutionary praxis. Given this kind of ambiguity and their emphasis on criticism, it is not surprising that it has often been said that it is easier to tell what critical theory is not than what it is.¹⁴ Nevertheless, with regard to class and society, it seems fair to say that critical theory has been characterized by an occasionally vague, but consistently Marxist perspective that features class struggle as a central concept.

Dialectical method

Marxists of all kinds pay homage to dialectical analysis as the premier method. However, anyone who expects this method to be used to test ideas is in for a disappointment, as is anyone who believes that the conclusions resulting from the use of dialectical analysis will be apparent to outside, open-minded observers. The truth is that dialectical analysis is, as Rockmore and his associates put it, a "social ontology" in Marxism, not a method in the usual sense of that term.¹⁵ I have contended elsewhere that with the demise of Marx's notions of historical necessity, dialectical analysis as a way of predicting the future was deemphasized by Marxists, and became a label for a variety of arguments made within a Marxian perspective.¹⁶ This is suggested as well by the quite common use of the term dialectical thought in

the Marxist literature.¹⁷ Marxist "methods" boil down to the application of the point of view, a point of view that is assumed, not tested. Put another way, the method of the critical theorists is not self-critical. Its justification is in the end ideological and metaphysical as was its origin, for as Dewey long ago pointed out, the Marxian dialectic was not derived from the study of historical events but from Hegelian metaphysics.¹⁸

No one denies that dialectical analysis in the sense of exploring contradictions and conflict and placing events in their social, political, and economic contexts can furnish useful antedotes to analyses that neglect such areas.¹⁹ However, when used to advance an ideology rather than to generate hypotheses, such notions can confuse and mislead. When conclusions are taken as givens, method becomes irrelevant.

While Marxists have emphasized the influence of social circumstances on the development of theory and the normative consequences of particular theories, they have failed to see implications for their own position. They have, according to Rockmore and his associates, granted themselves a "plenary indulgence" from the vitiation by ideology that they believe corrupts other perspectives.²⁰ This is ironic since Marxism is, as much as anything, an ideology.

What, then, do Marxists have to say about Pilate's question? A few, such as Gouldner, one of the more independent and more astute Marxist-oriented scholars, simply admit that the verification of theory must be separated from its social and ideological webs.²¹ Others, like Horkheimer, maintain the view that, "The verification and confirmation of ideas. . . does not consist in. . . experiments or in the search for documents, but in historical struggles, in which conviction itself plays an essential role."²² Some, like Habermas, construct a position based on the general Marxist perspective, but attempt to establish separate categories of knowledge. Thus, Habermas presents a set of three interests--the technical, practical, and emancipatory--that he relates to three corresponding sciences--the

empirical-analytic, hermeneutic, and critical--with the third interest and science clearly preeminent.²³ This trichotomy has been widely criticized. For instance, Warren decries the lack of clarity in Habermas' presentation of interests²⁴ and Bernstein contends that the categories are not distinctive and lack genuine epistemological grounding.²⁵ An important point is Habermas' failure to recognize sufficiently the interpretive aspects of empirical science and the empirical elements of hermeneutic science.

Habermas' notion of truth is based on what he calls communication competence and an ideal speech situation. This is a situation in which language is not distorted by such influences as ideology. Truth is the property of statements that command consensus based upon their inherent reasonableness or warranted assertibility. It is noteworthy that Habermas borrows Dewey's term for truth in setting forth what Pettit calls a consensus theory of truth.²⁶ However, Dewey's formulation is much more straightforward in its emphasis on a single process of inquiry and its grounding of knowledge in the operations of inquiry. This provides a conception of knowledge as tentative and changing that incorporates genuine criticism and self-criticism as part of its method.²⁷ Habermas, in contrast, constructs an awkward trichotomy that shelters Marxian thought in a special category. He then links emancipation and criticism with knowledge which is ultimately justified by language and reflection. But Habermas' conception of reflection is confused. Reflection in Dewey is anchored in inquiry, but in Habermas it is unconnected to nature or experience. In fact, Habermas seems caught in a kind of mentalism that has little grounding outside of mind, a paradoxical situation for someone attempting to renovate Marxian thought.

Habermas' difficulties reflect those of Marxian critical theory generally. He cannot ground his notion of truth in inquiry even though he adopts the term warranted assertibility. To accommodate his Marxism, he grounds truth in language and reflection which are apparently presumed to be entirely consistent with emancipatory

interests and critical, that is, Marxist, science. We see again the uses of ambiguity referred to earlier. It masks the contradictions that characterize current efforts to hold onto and justify the essential elements of Marxist ideology.

Educational Administration

The homogenization of other perspectives

Having considered a few issues and positions in critical theory, we turn to a somewhat more specific exploration of the situation in educational administration. Critical theorists writing in education tend to homogenize other perspectives. They see a world with only a few philosophical positions: theirs, positivism, and sometimes subjectivism if that is not lumped with positivism. This is nothing new. Earlier Marxists did the same thing. For instance, Jay tells us that "positivism was used by the Frankfurt School in a loose way to include those philosophical currents which were nominalist, phenomenalist. . . empirical, and wedded to the so-called scientific method."²⁸ Jay also notes how members of the Frankfurt School made "assumptions, such as the equation of pragmatism with positivism, that lacked complete validity."²⁹ Rockmore and his associates state that Marxists have difficulty distinguishing between positivism and pragmatism, and between phenomenology and existentialism as well.³⁰

Habermas is particularly indiscriminate in his use of the positivism label. For example, even though he admits that early positivism was interrupted by a counter tendency exemplified by Peirce and by Dilthey, he says that in the end the pragmatist Peirce "accedes to a concealed positivism" and the idealist Dilthey is "subject" to positivism and falls back into "objectivism."³¹ Positivism has even become an epithet in intra-Marxist polemics. For instance, writing about certain neo-Marxists from an orthodox perspective, Hoffman refers to "positivism with a 'left' face."³²

In the social sciences and education, critical theorists and other Marxists often refer to the "dominant paradigm." This ordinarily means positivism or functionalism depending on whether the context is philosophical or theoretical. In any case, both cover a multitude of sins. However, criticism of these positions typically is directed to straw men, an extreme scientism and an outmoded functionalism. This is unfortunate because it forecloses genuine intellectual discussion in favor of ideological preachment.

A culture of commitment

That Marxist scholars often appear to preach and become involved in what might be called dialogues of the deaf with opponents is probably related to the nature of Marxism and its history. The emphasis on class struggle and praxis creates an imperative for political action for Marxist scholars. However, the realities can be disillusioning. Since Marxists emphasize struggle, they are often embattled or at least so perceive themselves. Hence, historically, ideological conformity has frequently been demanded. Georg Lukacs' forced repudiation of his work History and Class Consciousness is but one well known example.³³ Jay notes that radical political movements, usually of the left, attract discontented intellectuals, but that the alliance is rarely an easy one. He called "the ebb and flow of radical intellectuals to and from various leftist allegiances. . . one of the constant themes of modern intellectual history."³⁴

The point of this excursion in the sociology of knowledge is that Marxian critical theorists are bound by a kind of culture of commitment that is likely to channel and limit seriously the kind of contribution they can make to a field of study. Furthermore, this culture of commitment differs in substance from the commitment of the non-Marxist inquirer. The Marxist commitment is to the theory of class conflict and its related elements, while the inquirer's is to norms that emphasize the

process of making and testing theories, not to a particular theory. The extent to which critical theorists will suffer the kinds of difficulties remarked by Jay is not clear. That critical theory as a point of view might eventually drop its doctrinaire, Marxist features is a possibility, but one that seems remote given the origins and history of critical theory.

Values

Critical theorists argue that values are central to administration.³⁵ I agree. However, that recognition is only a starting point. The crucial philosophical issues are the kinds of values and the kinds of ethical perspectives that should inform educational administration. On these issues, Marxism and critical theory are seriously deficient.

While praxis, essentially driven by class struggle, is a key element in Marxist thought, a broad and adequate treatment of axiology is lacking. Moreover, because Marxian praxis is oriented to a particular political program that depends upon a pre-given ideology, reflection on matters of morality is cut short. Yet, educational administration requires an ethical perspective that emphasizes the use of reflective methods to make concrete moral choices.³⁶

Marxism has little to offer administrators concerned with moral choices. Its program is basically utopian and out of touch with concrete educational problems. Moreover, school personnel are frequently prejudged and condemned as, among other things, agents of the ruling classes. In this connection, Frank recently wrote that, in order to make their points, radical critics of the schools negotiate with their readers a suspension of reality and the right to "use broad ascriptions of malintent, indolence, or plain stupidity to those who staff and govern the educational system."³⁷ On top of all this, the jargon and abstruse language of critical theorists is quite capable of causing the eyes of educators and others to glaze over. It is not surprising that Marxism has

not attracted much of a following among school administrators in most non-Marxist nations.

Another point that is usually emphasized in critical theorists' references to values is the separation of values and facts in what they like to call positivistic social science. In the Marxian view, this separation detaches social science from mankind's most pressing problems, and in particular from the class struggle.

However, normative and descriptive statements differ from a linguistic standpoint. This kind of distinction is recognized, if deemphasized, by some critical theorists. For instance, according to Sensat, while Habermas has often been described as attempting to overcome the dualism between is and ought, this can be misleading, since Habermas is quite concerned to avoid the fallacy of reducing one to the other.³⁸

The distinction is also relevant to the norms of scientific inquiry. These norms aim for disinterested skepticism in the process of testing theoretical formulations.³⁹ Critical theorists and others who believe that verification in social science or any science must fit an ideology, namely their own, have things turned upside down.

It is obvious that such forces as personal bias, ideology, and culture deeply impact on the choices made by scientists (or philosophers or politicians). Thus, it makes sense that norms in inquiry foster a completely open, anything goes posture for creative, hypothesis-making activities, but a much more critical stance once explanations have been devised.⁴⁰ This allows for the free play of divergent and independent thinking, but also insists that there eventually be a public assessment of reasoning and evidence. Inquiry seeks to control bias and ideology. If they are not controlled, verification is obstructed.

It is also obvious that theories can have social consequences. A related point is that knowledge can be put to good or evil uses. Here, one must depend upon humane and thoughtful moral choices. However, such choices do not bear on the level of corroboration of the theory in question. When critical theorists raise the issue that

science requires a warrant beyond itself, they seem to be saying more, namely that truth can be verified ultimately only in historical struggles.⁴¹ Put another way, truth has got to fit Marxist ideology. As framed by critical theorists, the problem can become one of infinite justification: if y must be justified by x, then x must be justified by w, and so on. However, the critical theorists stop with Marxist ideology, and it is clear that, in the end, justification of any theory, whether it is descriptive or normative, has to proceed on the basis of human reflection, reason and evidence.

In everyday life the descriptive and the normative are thoroughly intermixed. The practice of administration illustrates this. Educational administrators are continually faced with decisions, many of which represent genuine moral choices that involve competing goods. However, wise choice requires not only judgments about the desirability of various possible outcomes, but also judgments that are essentially empirical predictions about the likely consequences of given courses of action. These predictions are descriptive rather than normative. Hence, moral choice in administration is dependent upon both ethical vision and judgments about empirical probabilities, all set within a concrete organizational and community context. With its pre-given solutions, Marxian critical theory loses sight of the reflective and contextual character of moral choice in educational administration.

Part of the difficulty with the way critical theorists treat the is and ought or to use classical language, truth and good, is that something can be true but not good, or good but not true. To define truth according to a particular conception of good, as in Marxian thought, can be counter-productive. Truth can serve the good, but by appropriate applications in the process of ethical deliberation; the Marxist redefinition of truth simply leads to impractical ethics and bad science.

A number of the arguments that critical theorists make with regard to values have been explored and it is obvious that there are substantial weaknesses and confusions. Nevertheless, the problem of values in educational administration

deserves more attention than it has been getting. Even though there has been a variety of efforts in the past to do something about this,⁴² no major thrust has resulted. Perhaps the challenge of the critical theorists will help to stimulate more work along these lines.

Theory and research

Critical theorists writing on education essentially apply a Marxist perspective to the subject matter of that field. Their analyses of schools might explore such topics as gate keeping, mechanisms of control, or socialization to middle class values.⁴³ Ironically, these topics have been examined for some years by students of schools, often from a structural functionalist perspective.⁴⁴ The influence of social class in schools is another favorite subject of critical theorists. Again, this is a topic that has had extensive treatment in earlier non-Marxist oriented research such as Hollingshead's.⁴⁵

More abstract concerns are represented by theories of reproduction and resistance.⁴⁶ The conclusions reached appear to depend on whether the analyst chooses to emphasize the power of the ruling classes or the ability of the oppressed to counter and resist that power. However, reproduction theory neglects social change and, in particular, gives short shrift to education as a vehicle of change and to the place of critical thinking as an educational objective, especially in American public schools. Resistance theory is less developed, but it appears that student "resistance" ordinarily has little or nothing to do with class consciousness.

Critical theorists shy away from empirical work that tests ideas. Instead, they seek to bolster Marxist ideology. For instance, a study designed to show that a school channeled lower class students to less desirable careers and higher class students to more desirable ones might, if the data showed that the school facilitated upward mobility, shift to the conclusion that the school served the ruling classes and the

status quo by acting as a safety valve that repressed class consciousness. This hypothetical case illustrates what critical theorists mean when they contend that truth must serve the class struggle. Their viewpoint represents what Rockmore and his colleagues call the unity of social science and socialized science.⁴⁷ That is why Gray remarks that whatever incidental contributions Marxism may make to social science, it "does not in its main elements belong to the scientific mode of discourse."⁴⁸ This explains why so many non-Marxists are so wary of Marxian social science. It is what I had in mind when I wrote elsewhere that it is hard to imagine a Marxist scholar trying to disprove Marxian theory.⁴⁹ The unity of social science and socialist science represents a kind of intellectual vassalage in which the spirit of inquiry is lost. Reflection, curiosity, and skepticism give way to a grim determination to make points having an ideological twist. A major shortcoming of Marxian critical theory is its failure to pursue genuine and thoroughgoing criticism.

In educational administration, a fruitful stance towards critical theory is to see it for what it is, a perspective with enormous limitations, but to assess the particular ideas of critical theorists with combined skepticism and open-mindedness. Empirical generalizations should be examined relative to available evidence; theoretical interpretations on the basis of their logic, their reasonableness relative to other ideas, and their ability to direct inquiry; and ethical judgments in terms of their practical potential for realizing human dignity, freedom, and growth.

Put another way, some of the ideas of critical theory can be detached from the ideological web that enmeshes them and examined independently of that web. For instance, power, legitimacy, and control are useful concepts to use in attempting to understand what goes on in schools as well as other settings. Here, the contribution of critical theory is to call attention to differential effects for individuals, especially those who are members of groups that are disadvantaged. Similarly, the shared assumptions and understandings that emerge in modern industrial-technological

societies have moral consequences that need to be explored. Still, the ideas of critical theorists and everyone should be treated as hypotheses and assessed in appropriate terms, whether those ideas are labeled metatheory, metaphysics, or anything else.

Concluding Comments

It is desirable in educational administration to encourage a variety of methods, theories, and ideas. Such diversity can add substantially to the intellectual subject matter of the field. At the same time, it would be unfortunate if students of educational administration were split into a number of narrow, sectarian camps. Yet, critical theorists, and a few subjectivists as well, often seem more interested in proclaiming their ideas than in testing them. Some of them even see themselves as in the forefront of what they like to call a paradigm shift in the field.⁵⁰ Time will tell whether this is an illusion fed by hope. However, it appears unlikely that critical theory will become very influential in thought and research in educational administration. It is at a disadvantage because it incorporates the essential dogmas of Marxism and because it has so little to offer in the way of empirical research. Furthermore, critical theory is a good example of what has been called professorial Marxism and it is especially irrelevant to the concrete problems facing practitioners of educational administration. It is just as well that this view has so little to recommend it, since where Marxism has been dominant, social science has given way to ideology and inquiry has been set back.

Educational administration requires a quite different philosophy. An appropriate philosophy is found in a pragmatist-instrumentalist-naturalistic framework that offers educational administration and other fields a powerful alternative to positivistic or subjectivistic views, as well as to dialectical materialism and other forms of Marxism, including critical theory. Such a philosophy is open and tolerant, encouraging a variety

of approaches within the field, but it also demands clarity of method and expression and imposes a public standard of verification. Its epistemology and its axiology emphasize reflective methods. It recognizes that objectivity in this world is a myth, but strives to reduce the effects of bias and ideology. At once open-minded and hard-headed, this philosophy has much to offer educational administration. It can accommodate a wide range of theories and research methodologies because it treats them all as instrumentalities and holds that ideas are fundamentally hypotheses subject to inquiry and to revision. It has a natural connection to the concrete, everyday problems of practice with its suspicion of dogmatic thinking and formal systems and its emphasis on inquiry as a process that aims to reconstruct experience in ways that foster the realization of human potentials and growth. It can give us something that critical theory fails to provide, namely, a perspective that is genuinely critical.

Notes

1. For a history of the Frankfurt School from its beginnings through 1950, see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research 1923-1950. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973.
2. See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980. Held states that one branch of critical theory centers around the Frankfurt School, the other around Habermas. Others include Habermas in the Frankfurt School.
3. A consideration of various forms of neo-Marxism can be found in Ino Rossi, From the Sociology of Symbols to the Sociology of Signs: Toward a Dialectical Sociology. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
4. This commitment was an explicit one. On the amusing side, the student name for the Institute in its early days in Germany was Cafe Marx. When the Institute returned to Frankfurt from its exile in the U.S. the students called it Cafe Max, a reference to its director Max Horkheimer and to the earlier Cafe Marx. See Jay, The Dialectical Imagination.
5. These terms and others can be used to refer to the older but still very active Marxist-Leninist point of view. For a criticism of several neo-Marxists including critical theorists from such a perspective see John Hoffman, Marxism and the Theory of Praxis. New York: International Publishers, 1975.
6. Ron Eyerman, False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory. Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1981, p. 236.
7. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination.
8. Paul Connerton, The Tragedy of Enlightenment: An Essay on the Frankfurt School. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
9. See especially John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems. New York: Henry Holt, 1927; Liberalism and Social Action. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1935; and Freedom and Culture. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939.
10. Quoted in James MacGregor Burns and Jack W. Peltason, Government by the People. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952, p. 47.
11. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 20.
12. Roy Edgley, "Revolution, Reform and Dialectic" in Marx and Marxisms, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson. Cambridge, England: Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 14, Cambridge University Press, 1982.
13. Marxists have an abstruse language of their own. A comment by a reviewer of a book that was not on Marxism captured this well: "She knew that the high school girl trying to develop the requisite pep to gain membership in the in crowd had something in common with the young man trying to get down the correct Marxist lingo to win his revolutionary card." See Nancy Evans' review of Lisa Alther's Other Women in the New York Times Book Review, 89, 4 (November 11, 1984), p. 26.

14. The conclusion is from Held, Critical Theory, p. 24. However, he does not use the ambiguity argument.
15. Tom Rockmore, James G. Colbert, William J. Gavin and Thomas J. Blakeley, Marxism and Alternatives: Towards the Conceptual Interaction Among Soviet Philosophy, Neo-Thomism, Pragmatism and Phenomenology. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1981. See especially chap. 3 on dialectical logic.
16. Donald J. Willower, "Philosophy and the Study of Educational Administration." Paper presented at the Inter-American Congress on Educational Administration, Brasilia, DF, Brazil, July-August 1984.
17. For example, see Henry Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. Boston: Beacon, 1960.
18. Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 79.
19. See J. Kenneth Benson, "Organizations: A Dialectical View," Administrative Science Quarterly 22 (March, 1977) for an effort to apply dialectical analysis to organizations.
20. Rockmore and others, Marxism and Alternatives, p. 274. Notice again the usefulness of the analogy of dogmatic religion. Non-members are corrupted while members are saved.
21. Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. New York: Basic Books, 1970, especially pp. 13, 488.
22. Quoted in Held, Critical Theory, p. 191.
23. Some major works are Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, tr. Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon, 1971; Legitimation Crisis, tr. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon, 1975; and Communication and the Evolution of Society, tr. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon, 1979.
24. Scott Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
25. Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.
26. Philip Pettit, "Habermas on Truth and Justice," in Marx and Marxisms, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson.
27. See John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt, 1938.
28. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, pp. 47-48.
29. Ibid., p. 289.
30. Rockmore and others, Marxism and Alternatives, p. xi.
31. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, pp. 137ff.

32. Hoffman, Marxism and the Theory of Praxis, p. 180.
33. On Lukacs, see Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modernism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
34. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. xiv.
35. See, for example, William P. Foster, "Administration and the Crisis in Legitimacy: A Review of Habermasian Thought," Harvard Educational Review 50 (November 1980).
36. See my "The Professorship in Educational Administration: A Rationale," in The Professorship in Educational Administration, ed. Donald J. Willower and Jack A. Culbertson. Columbus: University Council for Educational Administration, 1964; "Schools, Values and Educational Inquiry," Educational Administration Quarterly 9 (Spring 1973); "Evolution in the Professorship: Past, Philosophy, Future," Educational Administration Quarterly 19 (Summer 1983); and the paper cited in note 16.
37. Fred P. Frank, "Review of The Structure of School Improvement," Educational Administration Quarterly 20 (Fall 1984), p. 114.
38. Julius Sensat, Jr., Habermas and Marxism: An Appraisal. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Library of Social Research, 1979. Pertinent citations to Habermas are Legitimation Crisis, p. 102 and Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 178.
39. Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
40. See my "Ideology and Science in Organization Theory," Educational Administration Quarterly 15 (Fall 1979).
41. See Held, Critical Theory on this point.
42. For example, the University Council for Educational Administration organized several seminars on values and educational administration and writers in educational administration such as Robin Farquhar, Erwin Miklos, Thomas J. Sergiovanni and Samuel H. Popper among others, have contributed to the literature on the topic.
43. For example, see Michael Apple, Ideology and Curriculum. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979; and Richard J. Bates, "Educational Administration, the Sociology of Science and the Management of Knowledge," Educational Administration Quarterly 16 (Spring 1980).
44. For instance, Talcott Parsons, "The School Class as a Social System," Harvard Educational Review 29 (Fall 1959).
45. A. B. Hollingshead, Elmtown's Youth. New York: Wiley, 1949.
46. Henry A. Giroux, "Theories of Reproduction and Resistance in the New Sociology of Education: A Critical Analysis," Harvard Educational Review 53 (August 1983).

47. Rockmore and others, Marxism and Alternatives.
48. John N. Gray, "Philosophy, Science and Myth in Marxism," in Marx and Marxisms, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson, p. 72.
49. "Philosophy and the Study of Educational Administration."
50. On paradigms see my "Mystifications and Mysteries in Thought and Research in Educational Administration," in Thought and Research in Educational Administration: The State of the Art, ed. Gladys S. Johnston. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985.